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WHY THE ACLU WAS WRONG ABOUT
NIKE, INC. V. KASKY

Tamara R. Piety*

I.

INTRODUCTION

2
I
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky was the great 2003 commercial speech "case that wasn't.",
3
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, it generated a lot of press coverage
with the expectation that a major revision of the commercial speech doctrine would be
announced. And then the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted.4 I was invited to offer my observations on this case because I contributed to the
argument in an amicus brief on behalf of the Sierra Club for the respondent, Marc
Kasky. 5 The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the organization of which our
honoree, Nadine Strossen, is president, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the petitioner,
Nike, Inc. Given my support for Kasky and the Sierra Club, it should come as no
surprise that I believe Nike's position was wrong. But I think the ACLU was wrong too.
Because I believe that the triumph of Nike's position would mean less freedom of speech
rather than more, I think the ACLU should have been on Kasky's side as well. This
article explains why and also why the ACLU's reasons for defending Nike may represent
6
an example of what Richard Delgado has referred to as "First Amendment formalism."

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. LL.M., Harvard Law School (2000);
J.D., University of Miami (1991). 1 want to thank Paul Finkelman for inviting me to participate in the 2005
Fifth Annual Tulsa Legal Scholarship Symposium. Thanks also to all of the other participants for their
generosity and interest, particularly Erwin Chemerinsky, Steven Gey, Burt Neubome, and Nadine Strossen
herself.
1. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
2. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn't: The Nike v.
Kasky Story, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965, 966 (2004).
3. See e.g. id. at pt. I (describing some of the press coverage).
4. Nike, 539 U.S. at 655.
5. Br. Amici Curiae of Sierra Club, Cal. Certified Organic Farmers & Ctr. on Race, Poverty & the Env.,
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/
supremecourt/briefs/02-575/02-575.mer.ami.sierra.pdf).
6. See Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal Realism,
29 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 169 (1994). The appropriate response to First Amendment formalism
may be a little realism. Professor Owen Fiss identified what Professor J.M. Balkin later called "ideological
drift" in the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions of the seventies. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986); see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism:Legal Realist
Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 383 (1990). Professor Fiss noted: "What startled me,
however, was the pattern of decisions: Capitalism almost always won." Fiss, supra, at 1407. This result he
claimed "seemed to impoverish, rather than enrich public debate." Id.
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First Amendment formalism involves reflexively concluding that if it appears
something falls into the covered speech category, any regulation or liability for such
speech must be wrong rather than considering the possibility that the doctrine itself is
insufficiently "nuanced, skeptical, and realistic" 7 for resolving the problem presented.
Such formalism relies on abstractions and absolute categories that compel results. Thus,
invoking the First Amendment with regard to speech immediately triggers a species of
this formalism that some would describe as "First Amendment absolutism"-the idea
that once put in the category of "speech" no quarter should be given to anything that
smacks of regulation lest it take us down a slippery slope to censorship. 8 This was the
position taken by the ACLU in Nike. Having characterized the speech in question as
protected speech and characterized Nike as a speaker entitled to protection, the
conclusion for the ACLU was clear-Nike's "right" to freedom of speech must
be protected.
Of course in some literal sense the case involved speech. However, it is not the
case that all speech, as the word is ordinarily understood by the layperson, constitutes
"speech" for purposes of the First Amendment. "[T]he freedom of speech does not
encompass freedom to fix prices, breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with
bookies, threaten, extort, and so on." 9 Much speech is not protected. Thus, a key issue
in Nike was what sort of speech was involved-political or expressive speech (highest
protection), commercial speech (limited protection), or some category of wholly
unprotected speech.' 0 Kasky argued that Nike's speech was commercial speech that was
(ultimately) unprotected because it was false. And a "nuanced, skeptical, and realistic"
analysis of the facts suggests that this reading was correct. It was certainly correct that at
the stage of a motion to dismiss, Kasky's allegations that Nike's speech was false had to
11
be taken as true.
But ultimately this case was not so much about freedom of speech as about what
sort of "person" a corporation is and whether the government is able to exercise control
over information in the market-the literal marketplace, not "the marketplace of
ideas." 12 What Nike's executives wanted was the unfettered ability to issue whatever
statements its representatives thought would advance the company's interests, even if
they knew these statements to be untrue. Absolving for-profit corporations from liability
for false statements of fact does not seem calculated to lead to more freedom of speech,
or any other kind of freedom for that matter. Certainly there will be less real information
available to consumers and the public at large. I have written about many of the issues
raised by this case more extensively elsewhere: Nike's claim for a right to lie; 13 why

7. Delgado, supra n. 6, at 170.
8. See e.g. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L.
Rev. 265, 274 (1981) (discussing absolutist theories).
9. Id. at 270-71 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
10. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 253-62 (Cal. 2002).
11. See e.g. Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996) (Pursuant to section 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all allegations in a complaint need to be taken as true.).
12. Br. Amici Curiae of ACLU for Pet., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 WL 721563 at *9 (Feb. 24, 2003)
[hereinafter ACLU Br.].
13. Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike's Questfor a ConstitutionalRight to Lie, 78 Temp. L.
Rev. 151 (2005).
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some public relations speech (as in the Nike case) should be treated as commercial
speech; 14 and the undesirability of thinking of the corporation as a speaker with rights
equivalent to those of a natural person.15 Those interested in a more detailed exposition
and defense of the positions, which are merely sketched here, should consult these
articles. Here I selected for discussion what I think are the most problematic of the
arguments offered by the ACLU in support of Nike:
(1) Nike's status as a for-profit corporation had no bearing on the analysis of its
speech.16
(2) The commercial speech doctrine does not, and ought not to, encompass speech that
17
is issued outside of the product advertising context.
(3) Allowing Kasky's suit to proceed past a motion to dismiss would be unfair and
18
result in an unbalanced debate, ultimately leading to less information.
The first two propositions can be supported by some case law. 19 But as always,
there is also authority to support the contrary argument. It is difficult to distill a clear
picture of the commercial speech doctrine from the Court's opinions. However, none of
the three propositions are supported by an analysis of the factual context in which this
case took place. Indeed, given this context, acceptance of these propositions seems
ill-advised from the standpoint of furthering freedom-political, economic, or social.
Each point is discussed below. First, in Part II, I describe the doctrinal and factual
background of Nike. Then, in Part III, I return to these three specific propositions and
2
offer arguments for why, ultimately, the ACLU's position is not persuasive. 0

14. Tamara R. Piety, FreeAdvertising: The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 Lewis &

Clark L. Rev. 367 (2006).
15. Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression: Some Reflections on Existing and
PotentialCosts (unpublished ms. at 2005) (copy on file with author).
16. See ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at *20.

17. See id. at *8.
18. See id at *22.
19. For example, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti is often cited in support of the proposition that

the status of the speaker as a corporation is not relevant to the question of the scope of First Amendment
protection. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual."). However, the expansiveness of this assertion was cast into question when, in a later decision, the
Court did that very thing, that is, concluded that the speaker's status as a corporation, or in that case, a
professional organization largely funded by for-profit businesses, did alter the First Amendment calculus for
purposes of analyzing the level of protection that would be afforded such speech. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of

Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Justice Marshall noted: "[T]he unique state-conferred corporate structure that
facilitates the amassing of large treasuries warrants the limit on independent expenditures." Id. at 660.
The Court is referring to campaign expenditures as a form of protected speech.
As I discuss further below, other decisions can be read as describing an advertising/non-advertising
distinction for purposes of discerning what constitutes commercial speech.

See infra nn. 112-117 and

accompanying text.
20. Those who are familiar with the Nike case and the commercial speech doctrine may want to skip ahead
to Part Il.
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1I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Set-Up

Nike, Inc., as most people are undoubtedly aware, is the world's largest
manufacturer of athletic apparel. Watch football, basketball, track, golf, or almost any
sport, and you will see "the Swoosh"-Nike's logo-everywhere. Nike has hundreds of
contracts with colleges and universities for the exclusive use of its apparel by the
school's teams. 2 1 Over the years it has had endorsement
contracts with many
22
White.
Reggie
and
Jordan
Michael
as
such
athletes
professional
23
In the mid- to late 1990s, Nike began to come under attack for its labor practices.
Bob Herbert, a popular columnist for the New York Times, criticized Nike on this
score. 24 Others followed suit.25 Similar criticisms surfaced on college campuses.
Leaders of grassroots, campus-boycott movements asked their institutions to boycott
Nike because of its labor practices. These movements sought to use the institutional
contracts to put pressure on Nike to change its labor practices.
Nike responded with a public relations campaign. This public relations campaign
included, but was not limited to, letters to athletic directors, letters to university
presidents, 26 letters to the editor, and "advertorials." 27 The purpose of this public
relations campaign was, I submit, not to weigh in on the debate on globalization (as Nike
later claimed), a goal with rather dubious connections to shareholder welfare and its
corporate purpose were it merely a contribution to a public debate. Rather, it represented
an effort by Nike's management to maintain the value of the company by influencing
public perception. And thus Nike sought to respond to university presidents and athletic
directors who contemplated not renewing their contracts on the basis of these allegations
about Nike's labor practices and convince them to continue doing business with Nike,
thereby boosting sales and increasing or reviving investor confidence. The public
relations campaign was simply good business. This was all well and good. No one
would suggest that Nike could not defend itself against untrue allegations. Surely, Nike
should be permitted to publicize the truth about its company, its practices, or any other
matter related to its operation. And Nike was certainly better placed than any other
entity or person to shed light on its own practices. There was only one problem:
According to Kasky, much of what Nike said in this public relations campaign was

21. See First Amend. Compl. at
14, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No. 994446)
(Cal. Super. Ct., July 2, 1998).
22. Id.;id.at 20.
23. See Collins & Skover, supra n. 2, at 975 (describing some of the public criticisms of Nike).
24. Id. at 970, 970 nn. 10-11.
25. Id. at 970-71,970-71 nn. 12-18.
26. The appendix to Justice Breyer's dissent in the Nike case is an example of one such letter to university
presidents and athletic directors. See Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. Advertorial.org is a web-based service dedicated to creating such materials.
Advertorial.org,
Advertorial Outsourcing Services, http://advertorial.org (accessed Jan. 15, 2006). It defines "advertorial" as
"an advertisement designed to simulate editorial content, while at the same time offering valid information to
your prospective clients." Id. at http://www.advertorial.org/what-is-an-advertorial.html (emphasis added); see
also InvestorWords.com, AdvertorialDefinition, http://www.investorwords.com/l3 1/advertorial.html (accessed
Jan. 17, 2006) ("Advertorial: An advertisement disguised as editorial.").
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demonstrably untrue.28 And, according to Kasky, the Nike executives responsible for
29
making the statements knew that these statements were untrue.
B.

The Suit

Marc Kasky is a private citizen in California. 30 He sued Nike claiming that many
of the statements made in the context of Nike's public relations campaign to refute the
sweatshop allegations were not true and thus violated the state's law governing unfair
competition and false advertising. 3 1 Kasky sued under a California law 32 that provided
that any citizen of California could sue on behalf of all of the citizens of the state of
California for violations of unfair trade practices, false advertising, and, in this case,
33
negligent misrepresentation and (most importantly) fraud and deceit.
In response to this lawsuit Nike filed a demurrer claiming that the First
Amendment acted as an absolute shield to any liability for either negligent or intentional
misstatements. 34 Of course a demurrer is like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. In essence Nike claimed there was no such cause of action. However,
given that the second count of Kasky's complaint alleged fraud and deceit, 35 this was a
fairly radical claim. Nike's demurrer was a statement that the claim for fraud and deceit
failed to state a cause of action because it, Nike, was absolutely protected by the First
Amendment and thus could not be sued-even if its representatives had intentionally
lied. It is worthwhile to pause to consider the significance of this claim. It is no small
thing to claim that the government is "absolutely barred" 36 from regulating or providing
a remedy for fraud.
As every lawyer knows at the motion to dismiss stage, everything pleaded in the
complaint must be taken as true. 37 As a consequence, any court should have assumed
for purposes of a motion to dismiss, that Kasky's allegations about what Nike said and
about what it knew were true. Nevertheless, the California trial court and appellate
courts agreed with Nike-that its speech was protected speech barring the lawsuit-and
dismissed the suit with prejudice. 3 8 A dismissal with prejudice means a case cannot be
re-filed under any construction of the facts or artful re-pleading. And, although Nike
later came to disavow this position and argued to the Supreme Court that Kasky's case

28. See Compl., supra n. 21, at

74-84.

29. Id.
30. Id.
at 8.
31. Id at 974-84.
32. Id.at 8 (citing the California Business and Professions Code). Interestingly, this aspect of the
California law was amended in 2004 by Proposition 64, which eliminated the private attorney general
provision. See Piety, supra n. 13, at 195 n. 256 (discussing Proposition 64). Not surprisingly many business
interests lobbied heavily for Proposition 64.
33. SeeCompl.,supran. 21,at 74-84.
34. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248 (citing U.S. Const. amend. 1).For more a detailed discussion of the
procedural posture of the case, see Piety, supra n. 13.
35. Compl.,supran.21,at 78-80.
36. Before changing its strategy in the U.S. Supreme Court, Nike argued to the trial, appellate, and supreme
court of California that Kasky's suit was "absolute[ly] bar[red]." See e.g. Ans. to Pet. for Rev., Kasky v. Nike,
Inc., 2000 WL 34449849 at *8(May 16, 2000).
37. See supra n. II and accompanying text.
38. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248-49.
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suffered from a pleading defect, 39 it initially and forcefully proclaimed that there was no
possibility of re-pleading40 or re-filing because Kasky's case was "absolutely barred"
by the First Amendment.
A divided California Supreme Court disagreed with these lower courts and held
that some of the speech was possibly commercial speech 4 1 and, ifit was commercial
speech, it could be susceptible to regulation and/or recovery for false claims. Therefore,
the Court remanded the case for trial.42 This decision did not mean that Kasky won.
It simply meant that the case could go forward. And, it could go forward into that area
that proved troublesome for the tobacco industry-the discovery stage.
Discovery was undoubtedly what Nike's management hoped to avoid. At least this
seems the best explanation for why it did not invoke any of the more powerful arguments
at its disposal for getting rid of the case, such as a SLAPP, 43 defamation, or
disparagement case. 44 Had it brought any such action Nike would have been the
plaintiff. As the plaintiff the burden would be on Nike to prove that Kasky's allegations
were untrue or frivolous, a burden Nike would have a hard time proving if Kasky's
allegations had a modicum of evidentiary support. Thus, instead of submitting to
45
discovery, Nike petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Court granted certiorari 46 and oral argument was heard. 47 And, as indicated above,
many court watchers thought the commercial speech doctrine was about to be subjected
to a substantial revision. These predictions were not realized.
The Court dismissed the case announcing that certiorari had been "improvidently
granted. '4 8 Nevertheless, the decision offered some indications in the concurring and
dissenting opinions as to where the Court might be inclined to go in future cases. What
these opinions had in common was they largely reflected acceptance of Nike's
arguments on the substance of the dispute--even if the Court was not prepared to
announce a new doctrine or a major revision of the existing one. 49 Nike had convinced
the Court, or at least those members who voiced their views, that what it was engaging in
was principally speech on matters of public concern rather than marketing. Put another
way, both the dissent and the concurrence seemed prepared to say that much of what
Nike had disseminated in its public relations campaign was not commercial speech.

39. See Piety, supra n. 13, at 168-78 (discussing this aspect of the case); supra n. 36 and accompanying
text.
40. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248 (quoting Nike's demurrer) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id.at 262-63.
42. Id.
43. "SLAPP" stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Collins & Skover, supra n. 2, at
974, 974 n. 34 (providing more descriptions and examples).
44. See e.g. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
45. See Nike, 539 U.S. at 657.
46. Id.
47. Oral Argument, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 WL 21015068 (Apr. 23, 2003).
48. Nike, 539 U.S. at 655.
49. Id.at 660 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting the speech was mixed); id. at 665, 668 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that Kasky's suit threatened to imbalance the debate). Justice Kennedy dissented from
the dismissal without opinion. Id. at 665.
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Doctrine: Commercial Speech

At this point it is necessary to raise the question: What is commercial speech?
No one really knows. The definitions are murky, and lines between types of related
marketing speech and regulated speech are unstable. 50 Indeed, that was one of the
problems in the Nike case-the uncertainty of defining "commercial speech." If Nike's
speech was "commercial" it was protected, but nevertheless subject to regulation for its
truth pursuant to the commercial speech doctrine. If it was not "commercial," it could be
either completely unprotected falsehood, or protected political speech that, while not
completely incapable of being regulated, is subject to strict scrutiny of governmental
51
attempts to regulate it.
It is hard to say what commercial speech is, but, whatever it is, the doctrine in its
current form has only existed since 1976 and the decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,5 2 which set up commercial
speech as a category of speech regulation subject to intermediate scrutiny. Prior to 1976,
commercial speech was not protected at all. 53 And whether the limitations on
commercial speech began then or the case simply expressed existing doctrine, we know
that in 1942 at least commercial advertising was not considered protected speech. That
was the year the Supreme Court confronted, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,54 a mixed
speech case involving a handbill that on one side offered the public the opportunity to
tour petitioner's submarine for an admission fee and, on the other side, registered a
protest against the city's dockage fees. 55 The Court found it had no difficulty deciding,
despite the political protest element in the handbill, that the commercial purpose
predominated and thus there was no First Amendment difficulty presented by
governmental regulation:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of
the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the
states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest,
they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thoroughfares.
We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
56
respectspurely commercial advertising.

50. For a very convincing argument on this point, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is
CommercialSpeech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1143 (2004).
51. There is some dispute whether all speech not falling into an exception of unprotected speech is by

default subject to strict scrutiny, or if instead it is only in the domain of public discourse that the First
Amendment strict scrutiny test applies. James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First
Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1091, 1095-96, 1095-96

nn. 20-21 (2004) (citing Rodney Smolla for the first proposition and Robert Post for the second).
52. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

53. There is some disagreement about this. See e.g. Robert M. O'Neil, Nike v. Kasky-What Might Have
Been..., 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1259 (2004) (representing what appears to be a minority view that speech
like Nike's would actually have been protected prior to 1942).
54. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
55. Id. at 52-53. Chrestensen had already once been told that his handbills violated littering ordinances in
New York City, but he was advised that political protests were subject to an exception to that ordinance.
Id. at 53. So he had his handbills reprinted to include a protest about the dockage fees. Id.
56. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
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However, by 1976, the mood and understanding of the Court had changed fairly
dramatically. Before that year, there had been a series of decisions which seemed to
suggest that perhaps there was some kind of protection for commercial speech, whatever
"commercial speech" might be. 5 7 Finally the Court did indeed announce such protection
in Virginia Pharmacy.58 The case involved publication of the price of prescription
drugs. 59 The question presented was whether it was appropriate for the state to suppress
price information on the theory that publication of price information by pharmacists
would lead to undesirable price competition, which would in turn decrease the quality of
the services provided. 6 ° The Court found this argument rested on speculation. 6 '
Truthful information, the Court noted, was necessary to the proper functioning of the
market and people cared as much, if not more, about the price of drugs than they did
about the most pressing political issues of the day. 62 Because proper market function
required information, and proper market function and the health of the economy was of
great public importance, the Court concluded the government should not paternalistically
interject itself into that market function by "protecting" people from the truth.63 The
Court held the listener has not just an interest but a right to hear price information. So, if
the information was truthful, it would be protected.64 Nevertheless, the Court held the
government retained the ability to regulate such commercial speech for its truth on the
same grounds, the proper functioning of the market, because it was only truthful
65
information that contributed to that proper functioning.
Notice that the first requirement of commercial speech protection is that the speech
to be protected be truthful. If it is not truthful, it would not seem to be covered by the
doctrine. But this again raises the question: What is commercial speech? Presumably
there is such a thing as untruthful commercial speech, which is completely regulable.
But this implies that there is a category of speech that is distinctly commercial. Being
true is not what makes something commercial, but under the doctrine it is what makes
speech in this category subject to protection. Truth or falsity is of no help in defining
what is "commercial." But the definition is crucial since truth is often said to be
precisely what the government may not regulate with respect to other areas of protected
speech. In other words, when will it be appropriate to ask whether the speech is truthful
as a precursor to evaluating regulation and when will it not, given that in the political
66
area "truth" is precisely the area that the government must avoid evaluating?

57. See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine:An Originalist's Recollections,
54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1189 (2004).
58. 425 U.S. 748.
59. Id. at 749-50.
60. Id. at 769-70.
61. Id. at 770-73.
62. Id. at 765.
63. Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 770-73.
64. Note that the conclusion that proper functioning of the market requires protection for the publication of
truthful information does not in any way compel the conclusion that the First Amendment need be the source
of that protection.
65. Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771-72.
66. For a discussion of the circularity of this inquiry, see Weinstein, supra n. 51. For a full discussion of
the cases and the definitional ambiguity in commercial speech doctrine, see Nat Stem, In Defense of the
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 Md. L. Rev. 55 (1999).
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The Court in Virginia Pharmacysuggested a couple of definitions for commercial
speech, both fairly un-illuminating, if not to say tautological. One of these definitions"speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction" 6 7 -was used
repeatedly by Nike and its amici,68 including the ACLU, 69 in the Nike case. Another
definition suggested by the Virginia Pharmacy decision and offered in many of the
supporting briefs for Nike 70 suggests that commercial speech is the equivalent of
"traditional advertising." 71 Putting aside for the moment that the word "advertising" is
itself imprecise, it is even less clear what would constitute "traditional" advertising or
why there should be any distinction made between traditional and nontraditional
advertising in terms of the doctrine. 72 However, to the extent that the Court itself
seemed to use the terms "commercial speech" and "advertising" interchangeably in
VirginiaPharmacy,73 it suggested that the Court at least thought commercial speech was
advertising. So, the argument went: If Nike's speech was advertising, it was commercial
74
speech; if it was not advertising, it was not commercial speech.
However, neither of these definitions-"commercial speech equals advertising" or
"speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction"--meshes very well
with the purposes announced by the Court for protecting commercial speech, that is, to
afford protection to truthful commercial information in order to enhance the operation of
the market, since such information relevant to market function is not limited to
traditional advertising. 75 On the other hand it is also the case that there is often very
little in the way of "information" in advertising and other marketing communications.
Much market information takes place in other forms: press releases, websites, interviews,
and other marketing strategies. So traditional advertising is too narrow. Even in 1976
when the doctrine was announced, the Court was working with a fairly outmoded

67. U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,409 (2001).
68. See e.g. Br. for the Petr., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 WL 898993 at *22 (Feb. 28, 2003) (citing Bd. of
Trustees of St. U. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989)) [hereinafter Nike Br.].
69. ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at **5, 9, 21.
70. See e.g. Br. Amici Curiae on behalf of the Arthur W. Page Socy., the Council of Pub. Rel. Firms, the
Inst. for Pub. Rel., the Pub. Affairs Council & the Pub. Rel. Socy. of Am. in Support of Petr., Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 2003 WL 835090 (Feb. 28, 2003). This brief is largely devoted to defending this proposition in order to
distinguish what its members do, i.e., public relations, from what it characterizes as more appropriately
regulated traditional advertising.
71. Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758-73 (using terms "commercial speech," "commercial
advertising," and "advertising" interchangeably as if they were all describing the same thing).
72. I offer a suggestion of what I think is motivating this in Free Advertising: The Case for Public
Relations as CommercialSpeech. Piety, supra n. 14. In summary, "traditional advertising" is often devoid of
any explicit assertions that can be tested for their truth. Assertions of facts are more commonly made in the
public relations speech that is more self-consciously oriented to the reader's rationality. Traditional
advertising, particularly by the largest companies, typically has more emotional content. For a discussion of
some of the problems with the emotional appeals made in advertising, see Tamara R. Piety, "'Merchantsof
Discontent": An Exploration of the Psychology ofAdvertising, Addiction, and the Implicationsfor Commercial
Speech, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 377 (2001).
73. See infra n. 113.
74. For a discussion of the content follows form argument, see Bruce E. H. Johnson & Jeffrey L. Fisher,
Why Format,not Content, is the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1243 (2004).
75. Weinstein suggests that "[t]he proper approach ... is first to ask what free speech values are implicated
by the regulation of the speech in question, and then, based on such an analysis, to categorize the speech in
question," rather than attempting to categorizing it without examining this context. Weinstein, supra n. 5 1,
at 1141.
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definition of "advertising." Today, most advertising does not propose any transaction or
offer much information. Moreover, in decisions after Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has
clearly found that the injection of some issue of public concern into promotional material
will not convert commercial speech into noncommercial speech.76
A different line of cases, one involving speech by corporations on political issues,
a strand distinct doctrinally from the commercial speech cases, also contributed to the
support for Nike's position. This strand begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,77 where the Court concluded that a
corporation's expenditures in a political campaign, namely advertising related to political
issues, was protected speech under the First Amendment. 8 This case was decided only
two years after Virginia Pharmacy and reflects a move, almost immediately, from a
decision that some protection for commercial speech was appropriate to protect listeners,
to the position that the commercial speaker was entitled to protection as a speaker-a
somewhat different proposition. 79 That the reasoning in Bellotti was later revisited in
1990 and substantially qualified, perhaps even arguably overruled in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce, appears to be a fact of collective amnesia on the part of
many of Nike's supporters. 8 1 In sum, going into the case there was no clear definition of
what made speech "commercial" and whether Nike's status as a commercial entity
would be in any way determinative of the issue.
III.

WHY THE ACLU WAS WRONG

These two strands of authority, Virginia Pharmacy and Bellotti, came together in
the Nike case because Nike's speech was not traditional advertising. The case arose in
the context of public relations and general marketing efforts rather than in traditional
advertising. Nike also characterized the statements in questions as speech relating to the
debate on globalization, 8 2 thus making it look more like Bellotti-type political speech
than like Valentine-type commercial speech, that is, more like political speech than like
promotional activity. Nike took corporate personhood and successfully transformed it,
for rhetorical purposes, into simply personhood. Accordingly, many observers seemed

76. E.g. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983) ("The mailings constitute
commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as
venereal disease and family planning." (footnote omitted)).
77. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
78. Id. at 766.
79. Nevertheless, the Virginia PharmacyCourt did view protection for the speaker as a predicate to finding
protection for the listener. 425 U.S. at 762-63. However, the argument with respect to the interests of the
speaker was made by analogizing the commercial speaker to that of a labor union. Id. Concluding that the
focus on economic matters did not remove the speech from protection and was something of a sleight-of-hand
in that, as noted in footnote seventeen, labor disputes represented a "special context." Id.; id. at 763 n. 17.
The Court spent little time distinguishing the interests of a commercial speaker from that of union members,
because the issue as the Court construed it was the standing of the consumer/listeners to invoke the First
Amendment. Id. at 763-64.
80. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
81. Neither Nike nor the ACLU cite or attempt to distinguish Austin in their briefs. See C. Edwin Baker,
Paternalism,Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 1161, 1165-66 (2004) (discussing the failure of the dissents in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, to discuss
the Austin case).
82. Nike Br.,supran. 68,at**1-2.
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to find nothing strange about the suggestion that Nike had a "voice" that needed to be
heard in a debate on a matter of public concern. Framed this way, and by invoking civil
rights cases, Nike aligned itself with civil rights marchers and historically disadvantaged
minorities and suggested that balance required that its voice be protected in order to be
heard. The ACLU followed where Nike led. All of these arguments were, I suggest,
misplaced, because the facts demonstrated that the speech was marketing, both in its
explicit goals and because the nature of a corporation means all speech by a corporation
must be viewed through that lens, and that protection for such marketing speech is
demonstrably not necessary in order for Nike's voice to be heard because it has both
ample means and opportunities to speak and powerful motives to do so that are unlikely
to be chilled by the requirement that its speech be truthful.
A.

Conflating Persons with CorporatePersons

Nike, and many of its amici, including the ACLU, used the metaphor of corporate
personhood to cast Nike in the role of embattled speaker. But it is this move, as in
Bellotti, to treat the corporation as a person, that distorts the inquiry and causes
commentators and amici to treat this as a freedom of speech case. Were the Nike case to
be recast as a request for constitutional protection for marketing activities and protection
from liability for false statements made in the course of promotional activities, it would
have substantially less appeal. But, if Nike's arguments were to be adopted, unregulated
marketing might well be the consequence.
While a corporation is a person for purposes of many legal issues and has been for
a long time, it has never been the case that a corporation's rights are the same as a natural
person for all constitutional purposes. 83 It does not follow from the proposition that a
corporation is a "person" for some legal purposes that it will enjoy all the rights of a
natural person, anymore than the fact that a corporation is a "citizen" for purposes of
federal diversity jurisdiction means it is entitled to vote in elections. 84 So, simply saying
that the corporation has some speech rights, as the Court did in Bellotti,85 does not mean
that those rights are coextensive with those of natural persons or, perhaps more
fundamentally, that the protection given to speech by corporations for marketing is
extended on the basis of the same concerns as the protection given to speech by human
beings. Although there is no single theory that undergirds the rationale for First
Amendment protection, most observers agree that a substantial basis for the protection
for freedom of expression is the protection of human dignity. 86 Arguably these concerns
87
do not apply to corporations.

83. See generally What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1758 (2001).

84. Id. at 1751-52 (discussing federal diversity jurisdiction). A vote might be a much less pernicious input
into politics than the current influence corporations can wield through lobbyists. Compared to that, what is a
mere vote?
85. SeeBellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-83.
86. See e.g. Baker, supra n. 81; see also C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech
(Oxford U. Press 1989); Roger A. Shiner, Freedom of Commercial Expression (Oxford U. Press 2003).

87. The argument has been made that individual self-expression also depends upon the availability of
expression from corporations to provide material and information with which to express oneself. See Martin H.
Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. Pa. L.
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Moreover, as a matter of corporate governance theory, it is not clear how a
corporation could ever be said to have an opinion that did not advance the shareholders'
interests in some way. Despite the calls for increased corporate social responsibility and
the inclusion in many state corporate governance statutes of a provision that allows a
board of directors to consider, without fear of liability to shareholders, constituencies
88
other than shareholders, such as employees, neighborhoods, consumers, and the like,
the status of the operation of such provisions is still unclear. 89 The only constituency
that a board must consider is its shareholders, and that consideration is generally limited
to shareholders' economic well-being, i.e., maximizing share value. 90 The late Milton
Friedman has argued that boards violate their duties to shareholders when they expend
resources in any fashion that fails to address this interest and, therefore, presumably have
no business getting involved in, or making contributions to, any public debate except
91
insofar as it advances that interest.
Apart from the theoretical grounds for distinguishing a corporate speaker from a
human speaker, there are doctrinal grounds as well. In its brief, the ACLU relied heavily
on Bellotti for the proposition that Nike's status as a corporation had no bearing on the
issue of whether its speech in this context should be protected. 92 The problem is, as
noted above, the Supreme Court has retreated somewhat from the stance of
undifferentiated treatment between corporations and natural persons since the Bellotti
decision. 9 3 Even in the area of the most protected speech, political speech, the Court
has held:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability, perpetual life,
and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets-that enhance their
ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on
their shareholders' investments. These state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but also permit them to use
"resources amassed in the economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the
'94
political marketplace.

Rev. 678, 678 (1982). This argument is, I believe, crucially dependant upon the characterization of the speech
as "information."
88. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E)(l)-(4) (Anderson 2004) (providing that a director of a
corporation may take into account the interests of employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers; the economy
of state and of nation; and community and societal considerations when deciding what is in the best interest of
the corporation).
89. See e.g. Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateSocial Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization,
35 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 705 (2002).
90. See e.g. The Good Company, The Economist (Jan. 22, 2005).
91. Milton Friedman suggests that there is only "one instance when corporate social responsibility can be
tolerated,... when it is insincere." Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and
Power 34 (Free Press 2004).
92. See ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at *iii (providing the Table of Contents listing references for Bellotti as
"passim"); id. at * 18 ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does
not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." (citing
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at *20 ("The essential question ... is whether
Nike's corporate status or economic interest... deprives the proposed speech of what otherwise would be its
clear entitlement to protection." (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778)).
93. See Robert L. Kerr, Subordinating the Economic to the Political: The Evolution of the Corporate
Speech Doctrine, 10 Commun. L. & Policy 63 (2005).
94. Austin v. Mich. St. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990) (quoting Fed. Election
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This observation, made with respect to political speech, must surely have even greater
application to that speech subject to less protection, i.e., commercial speech, given that
what makes it less protected is that false commercial speech is not protected, while some
false political speech may be. Although, as the ACLU's brief observes, there is, even for
commercial speech, a "significant measure of First Amendment protection" 95 that is only
extended to truthful speech. There is no "significant measure" of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech that is untruthful, false, and misleading. 96 And Kasky
claimed Nike's statements were just that-untruthful, false, and misleading.
B.

The Limitation of Commercial Speech to Product Advertising

The ACLU also argued that Nike's statements were "part of a nationwide debate in
which consumers were being asked to make a political choice about whether or not to
boycott Nike products, and to think more broadly about the role and responsibilities of
multinational corporations in a global economy." 97 This sort of speech, it argued, was
'9 8
distinguishable from "the commercial aspects of the speech proposing a transaction. "
The government's interest, it argued, was in regulating "product advertising" 99 and does
not extend to "speech concerning public affairs unrelated to products sales."' 100
Presumably referring to those statements referenced in the lawsuit, the brief suggested
"[n]one of these statements directly proposed a commercial transaction or promoted
Nike's products."''0 I respectfully disagree.
The best test of this claim is to review the statements Kasky included in his
complaint. For example, in a letter to the editor of the San FranciscoExaminer, Nike
Director of Communications, Lee Weinstein, wrote:
Consumers are savvy and want to know they support companies with good products and
practices .... During the shopping season, we encourage shoppers to remember that Nike
is the industry's leader in improvingfactory conditions. Consider that Nike established the
sporting goods industry's
first code of conduct to ensure our workers know and can
102
exercise their rights.
This letter certainly seems to represent speech proposing a commercial transaction.
It refers to the "shopping season" and it "encourage[s] shoppers to remember .... "
It would be hard to find a more straightforward invitation to trade than this letter. The
letter reminded consumers that Nike is an industry leader in protecting workers' rights
because its executives apparently believed this factor influences consumers' purchasing
decisions. Nike told consumers they could purchase Nike products with confidence that
they were not contributing to intolerable working conditions somewhere in the world
because its executives apparently believed this information was relevant to consumers'

Commn. v. Mass. Citizensfor Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,257 (1986)).
95. ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at *9.
96. Compl., supra n. 21, at 74-84.
97. ACLU Br., supran. 12, at *7.

98. Id. at *4.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
102. Compl., supra n. 21, at 27 (emphasis and ellipses in original).
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purchasing decisions. It is difficult to read these statements another way. So why should
this statement to consumers be protected from liability if it is not true? What great
principle is at stake that demands shielding Nike if this statement is not true?
This question seems equally appropriate to ask of all the statements Kasky alleged
were untrue and that Nike and the ACLU characterized as contributions to the debate
about globalization. Kasky alleged Nike made false and misleading statements in the
following areas:
protected from and not subjected to
(1) "[T]hat workers who make Nike products are
103
abuse;"'
sexual
and/or
punishment
corporal
applicable governmental laws and
(2) "Nike products are made in accordance with
104
regulations governing wages and hours;"'
with applicable laws and regulations
(3) "Nike products are made in accordance
'0 5
conditions;'
safety
and
health
governing
106
(4) "Nike pays average line-workers double-the-minimum wage in Southeast Asia;"10 7
(5) Nike "workers who produce Nike products receive free meals and health care;"'
(6) GoodWorks International, a group formed by Nike for the purpose of inspecting
Nike's operations overseas, and headed by former United Nations representative
Andrew Young, did a review of its operations and concluded that Nike is "doing a
good job and 'operating morally';"' 1 8 and finally,
10 9
(7) "Nike guarantees a 'living wage' for all workers who make Nike products."'
How does it contribute to the debate on globalization for Nike to report that its
workers receive free meals, if they do not? Can we say this is information? Or is it
misinformation? Although the claims about "operating morally" and a "living wage" are
ambiguous and appear to be more opinion than fact, the remaining assertions are simply
factual claims subject to verification and of the type that might be routinely supplied to
the government or to investors and which these audiences can expect would be truthful
on pain of legal sanction or liability if they are not. Why should the same duty not run to
consumers? And if Nike's right to mislead consumers stems from the First Amendment,
why does the First Amendment not represent a barrier to having to truthfully report this
type of information elsewhere-for example, to prospective shareholders?
These statements may or may not contribute to the discussion about globalization.
Nevertheless, they are not the sorts of claims that we generally consider inappropriate for
1
the government to regulate, or for courts to act as "arbitrators [sic] of truthfulness."' 10
To the contrary, these are the kind of factual claims the courts regulate all the time.
Indeed, we might say that this is precisely the function of a court system-to act as an
arbiter of truth with respect to such factual statements. If Nike reports in its regulatory
filings that it pays minimum wage or that it offers health care, we would expect these

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1(a).
Id. at
(b).
Id. at 1(c).
Id. at 1 (d).
Compl., supra n. 21, at

108. Id. at

Il(f).

109. Id. at

1(g).

1(e).

110. ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at *3.
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claims to be truthful. Why should we not demand the same in letters to the editor written
in order to influence sales?
In its brief, the ACLU referred to the government's interest in regulating product
advertising"'I as if commercial speech were equal to product advertising. 112 However,
commercial speech cannot be viewed as so limited, even though advertising was clearly
what was foremost in the Court's reasoning, 113 because not long after the establishment
of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia Pharmacy,the Supreme Court made clear
in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.1 14 that including some purely editorial
material in promotional speech did not transform it from commercial speech into
political speech. 1 5 In Bolger the merchandise was condoms, and the promotional
material included information on the use of condoms for the prevention of venereal
disease as well as for contraception." 6 Just as in Valentine, where the inclusion of some
"protest" content did not transform an advertising flyer into a political protest, the Court
in Bolger found that the inclusion of this purely informational content that was not
17
clearly sales oriented did not obviate the overall commercial character of the material.'
The key was its commercial character. Similarly, here the overall character of Nike's
communications was also commercial in character.
Moreover, as the ACLU itself argued, the rationale for protecting truthful
commercial speech is to protect sources of consumer information, not to protect the
rights of the commercial speaker. 118 But the governmental interest is in protecting
truthful information. Indeed, if a communication is not truthful, can it even be said to be
information? As the Supreme Court itself has noted, "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact." 119 And so it is unclear why holding Nike to account for the
distribution of untruthful or bad information is not entirely consistent with this rationale
or is in any way subverting the case law cited, which champions the right of consumers
to receive truthful information. The ACLU noted: "Commercial speech is protected to
safeguard the consumer's interest in 'the free flow of information and ideas.'
Quite
apart from the dubious breadth of "ideas," which would seem to apply to all First
Amendment protected speech, not just commercial speech, the key idea is, as the ACLU
notes, that "it is the interest of the listener that is paramount, rather than that of the
speaker."' 12 1 But the listener's interest is in receiving accurateinformation. This was all

111. Seeid. at *4.
112. See id. at *3 (again exempting "product advertising" from First Amendment coverage, along with

speech, where reputational interests are at stake, as if commercial speech were the equivalent of product
advertising); id. at *8 (referring to "product sales" and the appropriate regulation of the same).
113. In Virginia Pharmacy the Court refers to commercial speech and advertising as if the two were the
same thing. Compare Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759 ("the noion of unprotected 'commercial

speech' all but passed from the scene") with id. at 765 ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive .....
114. 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
426 n.
121.

Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 67-68.
ACLU Br., supran. 12 at **8-10.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at *7 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
21 (1993)).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Kasky sought to require by his lawsuit-to ensure Nike provided consumers with
accurate information about its manufacturing processes so that their decisions could be
"intelligent and well informed." 122 And it has never been the case that the Court has
concluded that the consumers' need for accurate information was limited to the desire to
buy "safe products at competitive prices" as the ACLU suggested. 123 The need for
accurate information arguably includes all aspects of the product that might be relevant
to its purchase.
Advertisers themselves try to set their products apart and recommend them as the
"best" on the basis of attributes such as the manufacturing process, whether on the
grounds of labor, environmental, or animal testing practices (to name only three), so the
consumers' desire for information about these attributes is no less an aspect of the
product than its country of origin, whether it was made by the blind or by Native
Americans-all process concerns that are protected by regulation. 124 For purposes of
consumer choices, what constitutes the best product is almost always a subjective matter
that may include factors such as labor practices. 125 That choice, as early case law
indicates, 126 is best left with the consumer. But the consumer can only make an
informed choice if the information he or she receives is truthful. It is not paternalistic to
provide remedies for false statements any more than it is paternalistic to provide
remedies for battery or breach of contract.
C.

Fairness,Balance, and the Preservationof Information

Finally, the ACLU, again echoing Nike, argued that all of Nike's speech was
issued in self-defense 127-thereby, presumably eliciting concerns about the fundamental
fairness of allowing self-defense. However, concerns about permitting self-defense do
not suggest that it may be conducted in any manner-by fair means or foul. The
issuance of false statements would seem to be foul means. Again, the trope of the
speaker with speech rights (rather than the public with the right to accurate information)
was invoked, this time to cast Nike as an embattled rights holder entitled to speak its
piece, as if its interests in this defense were dignitary rather than commercial.

122. Id. at *9 (quoting Va. St. Bd.of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 765) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at*5.
124. Br. Amicus Curiae of the Nati. Assn. for Consumer Advocs. Supporting Respt., 2003 WL 1844784 at
**18-19 (Apr. 4, 2003).
125. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction and the Regulation
of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (2004); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700 (2003). The evidence is somewhat mixed in other areas such as environmental
claims. See also Terence A. Shimp, Advertising, Promotion, & Supplemental Aspects of IntegratedMarketing
Communications 609 (6th ed., Thomson/South-Western 2003) (describing a failed "promise" of environmental
concerns as motivating consumer purchasing decisions).
126. E.g. Va. St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (describing protecting consumers from truthful
information as "highly paternalistic" and suggesting that "people will perceive their own best interests if only
they are well enough informed").
127. In its brief, the ACLU argued: "It was only in response to these allegations [i.e., criticisms of Nike's
labor practices] that Nike began publicly answering its critics, defending its overseas practices, and denying
claims that it was operating sweatshops under supposedly slave-labor conditions." ACLU Br., supra n. 12,
at *2.
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In addition, the ACLU argued, were Kasky's suit allowed to proceed, it would
represent viewpoint discrimination, 128 which would unfairly imbalance the public debate
and ultimately chill corporate speech, causing a net public loss of "valuable
information."' 129 All of these arguments can be summarized as some form of fairness
argument. Examined from the perspective of commercial self-interest and consumer
protection, the facts do not support these fairness arguments.
In the first place, it seems to stretch credulity to argue imbalance in the context of a
multi-billion dollar corporation, which spends enormous sums on communications with
the public where no other speaker spends anything approaching the same amount of
money in counter speech. 130 Moreover, because of these expenditures, Nike has far
more access to speech outlets and media than any of its adversaries, except perhaps
columnists like Bob Herbert. In the second, the suggestion that being required to
proceed through the discovery stage of Kasky's lawsuit would "chill" Nike's willingness
to speak seems unlikely, even if we were to presume that, contrary to Kasky's claim, this
speech was truthful and would thus represent lost information. 13 1 Nike had, and
continues to have, the most powerful incentive to disseminate its message of any of the
speakers involved-a financial one. Indeed, it was precisely for this reason the Supreme
Court thought the regulation of commercial speech was less likely to be troublesome,
because it concluded the motivations for such speech were so robust, speech was likely
13 2
to remain consistent with the limitations or costs associated with it.
It also does not seem at all unfair to require a commercial speaker to verify that its
statements about itself are accurate and truthful. Surely it is in the best position to know

128. Id. at *6.
129. Id.at **22-23. Given that Kasky alleged, and at the motion to dismiss stage one must presume it is
true, that Nike's statements were false, it is hard to imagine how the statements constitute "information" that
would assist consumers in pursuing their goals or effectuating their choices as the ACLU argued it would.
"Here, the information at issue is valuable to consumers primarily because it enables them to use their
economic buying power to pursue a larger political and societal goal." Id. at *5. If Kasky's allegations were
correct, it seems more likely to nullify than advance those efforts.
130. According to Kasky, Nike spent almost one billion dollars on advertising and marketing in 1997.
Compl., supra n. 21, at
13.
It is not clear whether "marketing" would include public relations
communications. If it did not, the figure for total expenditures might be even larger.
131. Although Nike claimed it had withheld various reports from the public as a result of the California
Supreme Court's decision, the sincerity of this position, given the pending litigation, was suspect. See Carolyn
Wu, Bush Administration, ACLU, Organized Labor, Media and European Entities Join Together To Protect
FirstAmendment in Supreme Court Case Involving NIKE, Inc. (Nike Press Release) (March 3, 2003) ("The
company said it would not publicly release its annual corporate responsibility report ....It also said that it has
declined to participate in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index [and further] declined to participate in several
media interviews as well as invitations to speak at various business and academic forums due to the decision.")
(available at http://www.nike.corn/nikebiz/news/pressrelease.jhtml?year-2003&month=03&letter=a).
And
although the California decision is apparently still good law, at least it was when Nike's 2004 Corporate
Responsibility Report was issued, Nike has continued to issue press releases in this area and even do its own
"reporting" on abuses found in its factories. See David Teather, Nike Lists Abuses at Asian Factories,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ethicalbusiness/story/0,14713,1459135,00.html (Apr. 14, 2005); see generally Nike,
Inc., FY04 Corporate Responsibility Report (2004). Perhaps with the passage of Proposition 64 and the
elimination of the private attorney general provision, Nike's representatives feel confident that company has
nothing to fear from the government on this score.
132. The Court noted in Virginia Pharmacy: "[Clommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds.
Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by
proper regulation and forgone entirely." 425 U.S. at 771-72 n. 24. However, note also that this quote
illustrates the Court's tendency to use the terms "advertising" and "commercial speech" as if they
were synonymous.
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(although its interests may obviously be, as Milton Friedman noted, 133 to say something
that is not true if it thinks that is what the market wants to hear). Nevertheless, Nike
managed to analogize its position to that of the defendants in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan134 and claim that the verification of the truth of its claims would be unduly
burdensome, thus chilling valuable speech-a theme echoed by the ACLU. 13 5 How this
analogy was raised requires a little additional background.
In response to Kasky's initial pleading, and continuing through the appeals in the
California courts, Nike claimed that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First
Amendment. 136 However, this position was modified somewhat in its brief before the
Supreme Court. There, Nike argued for the first time (as an alternative basis to a
complete bar) that Kasky's suit was defective because it failed to meet the standard set
by Sullivan,137 that is, that Kasky had failed to plead the actual malice standard set 139
in
Sullivan. 138 Suffice it to say, this claim was inaccurate as a matter of pleading.
But what is more significant for purposes of this discussion is that the analogy was
inapposite as well.
In the first place, Sullivan was a libel case; Nike was not. So it is not surprising
that Kasky would not have pleaded elements of a different cause of action. Kasky could
not have alleged that Nike had malice against itself, so no one should be surprised that
Kasky did not plead malice. He did, however, plead fraud and deceit, which are
140
intentional torts.
But the facts were also significantly different in ways that go to the heart of the
fairness inquiry. The defendants in Sullivan were persons who were soliciting
contributions for the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., via an advertisement in
the New York Times. 14 1 The advertisement contained statements recounting some of the
struggles civil rights marchers and workers had with law enforcement and other
government officials in the South. 142 A police commissioner from one of the cities
mentioned sued the group and the newspaper for libel, claiming that, even though he was
not mentioned by name, he was sufficiently identifiable such that any inaccuracies in the
advertisement constituted a libel against him. 143 In reviewing his claim the Supreme
Court concluded that speech concerning a public figure, on a matter of public concern,
133. See supra n. 91 (quoting Milton Friedman).
134. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
135. See ACLU Br., supra n. 12, at **22-23.
136. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248-49 (describing pleadings in trial court and reasserted on appeal).
137. Nike Br., supra n. 68, at *44. The argument, subtly made, was that the California statutes under which
Kasky was suing failed to distinguish between negligent misstatement and intentional misstatement and, thus,
the infirmity was in the statute (presumably why it could not be cured by re-pleading). Id. Interestingly
enough, this argument was the last made in the brief, and Sullivan was only briefly alluded to there. Id.
It assumed more prominence in the actual oral argument and in the concurring and dissenting opinions issued.
See Nike, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring), 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Oral Argument, supra n. 47.
138. I have devoted an entire article to refuting this point and will not repeat those points here. See Piety,
supra n. 13.
139. For a more complete discussion of this aspect, see Piety, supra n. 13.
140. See Compl., supra n. 21, at 78-80.
141. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-57; see also id. at 256-62 (describing pleading history and factual
background).
142. Id. at 256-58.
143. Id. at 257-58.
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could only be actionable on an allegation that the libel was made with actual malice.
Mere negligence would not suffice.
The opinion contains much discussion about the impossibility of ensuring
complete accuracy in political debate. 145 Nike made use of this discussion in its brief to
claim that, as for the defendants in Sullivan, to require absolute accuracy in Nike's
statements would be to impose an oppressive burden on it and that "'erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate,' and therefore 'must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the breathing space that they need to survive."' ' 14 6 Justice
Brennan writing for the majority in Sullivan observed it may even be the case that there
147
is some informational value in falsehoods in the area of political speech.
But all of these statements must be viewed through the lens of the factual
circumstances of the case, i.e., a libel case where the defendants' speech concerned other
people. The defendants in Sullivan were talking about the police and the police
commissioners. 148 They were not talking about themselves. It is not unreasonable to
assume that political debate might be unduly chilled if every participant must be sure of
the accuracy of every statement made about persons and situations about which they may
not have complete information. This is particularly true where the powerful might seek
to suppress the speech of the relatively less powerful by holding them to a rigorous
standard of absolute accuracy, as indeed the plaintiff Sullivan appeared to be attempting
to do.
In contrast, Nike was talking about itself With respect to the corporation's
activities: Who is in a better position to know what Nike is doing than Nike itself? It is
not at all clear that there is anything inevitable about intentional false promotional
statements made on behalf of corporate interests. Nor do such statements add anything
valuable to public debate or to market function. There is nothing fundamentally unfair
about requiring the person who is talking about himself say something that is true. How
much less unfair is it in this context where it is a commercial organization issuing speech
for the purpose of favorably influencing purchasing decisions? The organization has no
human feelings to express, nothing to "get off its chest," no expressive interests. Rather,
it is trying to increase sales. As the Court noted in VirginiaPharmacy:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
be. intelligent
and well
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,...
, , 149
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
It is difficult to understand what could possibly be the justification for giving
manufacturers and sellers a shield from liability for false information issued in order to

144. Id. at 283-88.
145. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-83.
146. Nike Br., supra n. 68, at *44 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72) (internal quotation marks and

ellipses omitted).
147. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n. 19 ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution
to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."' (citations omitted)).

148. Id. at 257-58.
149. Va. St. Bd.of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 41 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 7
TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 41:715

generate sales, or what fairness principle requires such a shield. Consider the following
statements regarding a living wage.
According to Kasky's complaint, on October 27, 1997, Kathryn Reith, Nike's
Manager of Women's Sports Issues, issued a press release offering that "Nike is
fulfilling our responsibility as a global corporate citizen each and every day by
guaranteeing a living wage for all workers ... and creating opportunities for women's
financial independence." 15 0 However, Kasky also alleged that just a month before this
statement was issued, Dusty Kidd, Director of Nike's Labor Practices department wrote
a letter to Dr. Prema Matai-Davis, Chief Executive Officer of YWCA of America,
saying:
I am fully cognizant of the call on the part of some for a "living wage." That is generally
defined as sufficient income to support the needs of a family of four. We simply cannot ask
our contractors to raise wages to that level-whatever that may be-while driving us all
out of business, and destroyingjobs, in the process. 151

In light of the letter to Dr. Matai-Davis we can say that whatever a living wage is, Nike's
representatives know Nike does not pay it. So when its representatives said Nike paid a
"living wage" they did not believe it to be true. It is hard to conceive why fairness, an
interest in preserving the flow of information to consumers, or an interest in balance
requires this sort of constitutional shield. Indeed, to the extent that such protection
would seem a license to commit fraud, it would be a constitutional sword, not just a
shield. 152 Nike wrapping itself in the mantel of the embattled speaker and appropriating
the status of the oppressed minority voice has some comic aspects as Professor Rodney
1
53
Smolla captured in the title to his article on the case entitled, "Freethe Fortune 500.!"
It would be funnier if the consequences were not so serious.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court observed:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown
out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative

150. Compl., supra n. 21, at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis and ellipses in original).
151. Id. at 25, 63 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
152. Corporations often proceeded fairly aggressively to suppress speech of those whose speech they claim
infringes on copyright or trademark, or which they argue constitutes unfair competition or disparagement of
their products or company. One notorious example is the libel case McDonald's Corporation pursued against
two impecunious London Greenpeace members who distributed a flyer criticizing, among other things, the
nutritional value of McDonald's foods, and its labor and environmental practices. See McSpotlight.org,
The McLibel Trial, http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/index.htm (accessed Jan. 22, 2006); McSpotlight.org,
The McLibel Trial Story, http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/story.html (accessed Jan. 22, 2006). For
additional examples of corporate interference in speech generally through pressure exerted on governmental
bodies, see William A. Wines & Terence J. Lau, Can You Hear Me Now?-Corporate Censorship and Its
Troubling Implicationsfor the FirstAmendment, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 119 (2005). Wines and Lau's claim seems
to rest primarily on the dangers of imbalance arising from the influence of the most powerful corporations that
would suppress the speech interests of others, including perhaps other, smaller corporations.
153. Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over Corporate Speech and the First
Amendment, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1277 (2004). Note that all of Smolla's arguments regarding paternalism
rely on case law denying the government's ability to regulate truthful information, precedent that is arguably of
dubious relevance for the proposition that it is in any way paternalistic to regulate sanctions for
untruthful speech.
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findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these
arguments would merit our consideration. But there has been no showing that the relative
voice of corporationshas been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda
in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry
in government. 154
That day may be here. We are standing at a juncture in which the influence of
corporate voice is threatening to democracy and to the government's ability to address
grave issues of public concern. 155 The advertising of tobacco, pharmaceutical drugs, and
other substances affect public health. The infiltration of public relations into the news,
and presented as news instead of promotion, often in support of corporate interests,
decreases the reliability of the media and thus the public's source of information. The
lobbying efforts of corporations have arguably resulted in a reduction of confidence in
the government.
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech on the grounds that the government had no legitimate interest in that
context to protect consumers from truthful information. It would be a perversion of that
holding to hold that the disseminators of commercial speech are entitled to constitutional
protection for the dissemination of false information simply because the speech was not
explicitly tied to some product or because it was not uttered in a conventional
advertisement. The Virginia Pharmacy case did not address the rights of the corporation
or of the individual pharmacists to speak so much as it addressed the right of the
consumers to hear. If that is the basis for protection of commercial expression then, it
seems clear, as the Court stated in Virginia Pharmacy, the government should be able to
make sure "that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well
156
as freely."'

154. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90 (emphasis added, citations and footnote omitted).
155. With respect to many of these concerns, such as the environment, while the government can regulate
and try to make corporations internalize some of the costs like environmental pollution, consumer choice can
have this effect as well. Governmental regulation is in some sense a blunt instrument. In order for an
environmental change to really take hold it takes wide-spread voluntary cooperation. Thus, government wants
to encourage such widespread, voluntary cooperation to achieve these public goals. The inability of consumers
to verify environmental, labor, animal testing, and other process concerns means that consumer interests in
using their purchasing power to meaningfully address such issues will be thwarted at the outset. If consumers
cannot reliably tell the difference between a product that is "green" and one that is not, then the company that
takes the trouble to incur any additional process costs is going to be at a competitive disadvantage compared to
those who do not, where both companies are equally free to claim that their products are green. Put another
way, if there is no cost associated with this misrepresentation, then the companies who are not assuming that
additional marginal cost of the process can free-ride off those who are. It is unclear whether, in a world of
reliable information, most consumers would prefer green products in sufficient numbers to effect real change.
But it is a certainty that in a world with no penalty for false information, consumers will be relatively impotent
in their ability to effect meaningful change.
156. Va. St. Bd of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 772.
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